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Tartaglia's Italian Euclid of 1543 is geometry in the narrow sense. But the big 
two books of 1543, Copernicus' De revolutionibus and Vesalius' De humani 
corporis fabnca are also geometry, if a slightly wider sense of the term is 
allowed. Though Copernicus writes on physics, he does not speak of forces, 
energies, masses or the like: there are only the appearances of the heavens 
from certain points of view. Though Vesalius is biology, there is little 
physiology, or mechanical analogy, or discussion of causes: the emphasis is on 
how parts of the body look from suitable points of view. But the three books 
share more than just pictures, and it is this extra element that is the focus of 
this article. Euclid's Elements is not a picture book of shapes. The point of 
Euclid is to reason about the diagrams, and expose the necessary interrelations 
of the spatial parts. So it is with Copernicus and Vesalius. The text of 
Copernicus is an exercise in reasoning about which geometrical scheme will 
best fit the sequences of spatial points recorded in the astronomical tables. 
Vesalius uses the best of the discoveries of artists to make easy for the reader 
inference about how the systems of the body look in isolation, and in relation 
to one another. The difference between a Vesalian diagram and a photograph 
is exactly that the former allows one to work out structural facts which are 
almost invisible in the photograph. The plates also allow muscles in the 
partially dissected cadaver to be drawn with the natural tensions of the living 
body-obviously impossible with a photograph. 
An exclusively geometrical focus persisted in science in the work of Kepler, 
in both his ellipse theory and his Platonic solids theory of the planets l (as well 
as in his optical theory). Galileo's first success, the Sidereus nuncius, is, 
amongst other things, about inferring the shape of the moon's surface from 
optical considerations of light and shadow.2 Galileo's famous saying that the 
universe is written in the language of mathematics, which when quoted in 
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isolation makes us think, for example, 's = Yz gt2', continues in the original, 'its 
characters are triangles, circles, and other geometrical figures, without which it 
is humanly impossible to understand a single word of it'.3 Descartes still 
believes that the way forward for science is to ignore all properties of matter 
except the purely geometrical, but he is already starting to be old-fashioned. By 
then the next generation had begun to invest science with the many things 
beyond pure geometry that we now regard as essential to it, and which it was 
the achievement of the Scientific Revolution to put together-experiment, for 
example, and forces, and algebraic formulas. 
Since a Scientific Revolution was plainly under way by 1610, and since at that 
time it had achieved almost nothing except in geometry, the thesis, 'The 
Scientific Revolution was kick-started by geometry' is well-supported. This 
article is intended to explain this fact, by tracing how medieval and 
Renaissance reasoning with diagrams, both physical and mental, trained 
Europeans to think adequately to do science. 
Part 1 deals with physical diagrams, part 2 with mental ones. The two parts 
are not as distinct as may appear at first glance, since diagrams are pictures that 
are especially simplified to cause a mental construct stripped of irrelevancies, 
while an imagined diagram is imagined as like a physical picture. 
1. DIAGRAMMATIC REASONING 
1.1 Image and Diagram 
First, a little precision is desirable on the entities like 'diagrams' and 'images'. 
This is especially necessary because of the very wide and imprecise usage of 
the word 'image'. 'Image' is commonly used as a dead metaphor, meaning 
something like 'implicit theory', so that a phrase like 'the medieval image of 
the world' has no specially visual or spatial content.4 Or take titles which do 
claim to refer to pictures, like, 'Images of the other in incunabular woodcuts: 
Renaissance constructions of ethnicity and gender'. The post-modernistfrisson 
makes the author's commitments clear enough, but in the process neglects 
certain necessary distinctions among 'images'. These are the distinctions that 
are common ground in artificial vision research and satellite image processing, 
where 'images' are classified according to the amount of cognitive processing 
incorporated into them. One distinguishes at least the following three stages: 
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1. The raw image, such as a photograph, or the moving dots on a TV screen. 
Or perhaps the Shroud of Turin, to take a medieval example. 
2. A line drawing, like a Durer rabbit. The edges and regions are explicitly 
identified, but there is as yet no labelling of the objects in the scene. 
3. A map or plan. Here there are symbols attached, identifying some line as a 
road, or some dot as a church. The symbols are on the map in places that 
preserve the spatial relations between the entities symbolised-all the 
spatial relations if the map is ' to scale', or only some of them in examples 
like the usual plans of the London Underground, where only spatial order 
is preserved. 
Beyond these three there are purely textual descriptions of space, as with a list 
of objects in a scene, or a description of how to get to the East. The 
representation of information can be compressed and informative, but also 
subject to alarming errors of scale, of the kind made famous by Columbus and 
the Children's Crusade. 
'Diagram' is a wider term than 'map' or 'plan', in that what a diagram 
represents need not be spatial. A diagram is a picture, in which one is intended 
to perform inference about the thing pictured, by mentally following around 
the parts of the diagram. The famous saying, 'A picture is worth a thousand 
words' is true especially of diagrams, those pictures streamlined for inference 
by removal of irrelevancies (such as, usually, shading and real colour). (A 
photograph may not be worth any words at all, as a beginning student of 
biology realises when confronted with slides of the view down a microscope.) 
'Worth a thousand words' for what purpose? As a store of information, from 
which inference can proceed.s 
Consider the common medieval diagram of the Wheel of Fortune6 (fig. 1 
shows Villard de Honnecourt's especially abstract representation of it7). One is 
supposed to start at any of the positions (most naturally the top), then follow 
the circle clockwise to infer the order of events, and eventually return to the 
starting point. The (spatial) circle of the diagram thus represents time in the 
cycle of events. The Wheel is in fact a particularly bad diagram of fortune, 
because of the incorrect inferences it encourages. For example, it suggests that 
reversals of fortune happen inevitably, and even at inevitable intervals, as the 
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Figure 1. Villard's Wheel of Fortune. The Sketchbook of Villard de Honnecourt. 
Wheel turns inexorably. Seeing fortune in terms of the Wheel must, then, 
inhibit any thinking of it in terms of randomness, where the time until a 
reversal is completely unknown, as it is in real life. From the present point of 
view, this simply casts light on what a diagram is: it represents spatially the 
structure, or what is believed to be the structure, of something, in a way that 
facilitates the reaching of conclusions about it. A diagram thus contrasts with 
a single drawn figure (of a saint, for example), in which there is no intention 
that one should follow from part to part and infer anything. It also contrasts 
with such things as Islamic geometrical decoration, where there are complex 
arrangements of geometrical parts, but parts that have no meaning. 
A diagram of higher quality, where the inference is good, is the Square of 
Opposition in logic (fig. 2). Here, lines in space represent logical relations 
between propositions. The Square is apparently due to Apuleius of Madaura, 
in the second century AD. The original text contains not a diagram, but a 
description of how to draw one.8 The logical relation between any proposition 
and any other can be read off immediately from the diagram. 
Before going further, it will be useful to have a rough classification of the 
kinds of pictorial representation, which will help organise the topics to follow. 
Let us represent the classification itself with the usual diagram, a tree (fig. 3). 
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Every pleasure 
is good 
inconsistent 
al res 
No pleasure 
is good 
Some pleasure Some pleasure 
~~ ~~~ 
Figure 2. Apuleius' Square of Opposition. 
The dotted line indicates the connection that gives perspective its peculiar 
fascination: by drawing something according to geometrical rules (and filling 
in with colours) one has something recognisably like a photograph. (On the 
controversy as to whether images literally resemble their objects, the present 
article accepts the affirmative side.9) On the connections between geometrical 
diagrams and perspective, more will be said later. 
Medieval texts are often rich in diagrams, even if that is not always clear 
from modern editions which criminally leave them out.!O Our survey begins 
from the bottom left of the tree below. 
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Figure 3. Classification of pictures. 
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The Wheel of fortune is far from the only circle diagram common in medieval 
texts. Isidore of Seville's Etymologies, the standard medieval encyclopedia, is 
sometimes called the Liber rotarum on account of the number of rotae, or 
wheel diagrams. Among the most popular were ones linking the four elements 
and the four humours, and those linking the zodiac, months and seasons. ll 
There are a few medieval diagrams in which the wheels are physically 
separate pieces joined to the page with string, so that the rotation can be done 
in reality and not just in the imagination. A fourteenth century book on 
divination includes two geared wheels; the smaller one is rotated on a peg, and 
the larger one comes to rest at a number which is interpreted according to the 
instructions in the book. Ramon Lull's Art (a method for demonstratively 
confuting the heathen and recovering Jerusalem) used rotating discs (as well as 
various trees). 12 The various complicated wheels illustrating parallels between 
the seven virtues, the seven vices, the seven Beatitudes and the seven gifts of 
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the Holy Spirit are perhaps better imagined than pictured.13 The English phrase 
'by rote' probably derives from the ubiquity of wheel diagrams in medieval 
education (or if not, it is from the French 'route', wruch refers to another 
diagrammatic way of organising facts).14 
1.3 The Rank Growth Of Trees 
One of the most widely visible of medieval diagrams, in the full sense of 
something geometrical on which one performs inference by following the 
diagram around, was the Jesse tree. A Jesse tree is the family tree of Christ, 
going back to Jesse, represented in stained glass or some other medium. 
Typically, it is rather abbreviated, but some examples have up to fifty 
personages in the leaves.1s The reference is to Isaiah 11:1, 'A shoot springs 
from the stock of Jesse, a scion thrusts from his roots'. Whether an actual 
family tree is envisaged in the original is not entirely clear-the Bible is not 
rich in visual imagery, except for the apocalyptic books. The ancient sources 
mention family trees displayed by Roman families in their homes,!6 but no 
examples are known. Medieval texts, on the other hand, are full of them. There 
are family trees of kings;!7 also of gods. 18 
The legal world was also familiar with family trees. A kind of generic family 
tree was common in legal texts to illustrate family relationships, and the 
degrees of consanguinity to be inferred from them; an example available to 
almost everyone literate is in Book 9 of Isidore of Seville's Etymologies.19 The 
same information on family relationships can be depicted by quartering a coat 
of arms. Sir Anthony Wagner's Historic Heraldry of Britain explains the 
complexity of the inferences involved in interpreting arms: 
A husband impales his wife's Arms with his own, unless she be her father's 
heir or coheir in blood (that is to say, if she has no brothers), when he displays 
them on an escutcheon of pretence, superimposed in the centre of his own 
shield. In the latter case only, the children acquire a right to quarter the Arms 
of their mother's family (and any quarterings previously acquired in the same 
way by that family) with their father's. In this way a shield with many 
quarterings indicates a succession of heiress marriages, so that the bearer 
represents in blood all the families whose Arms he quarters. 20 
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These Gothic extravagances belong especially to the very late medieval period 
examined in Huizinga's Waning of the Middle Ages. Huizinga acutely observes 
how the excessive growth of trees is part of 'symbolism in its decline', and tends 
to substitute for serious causal thought: 
The world unfolds like a vast whole of symbols, like a cathedral of ideas. It is 
the most richly rhythmical conception of the world, a polyphonous expression 
of eternal harmony ... All notions of one thing proceeding from another took 
the naive form of procreation or ramification. The image of a tree or 
pedigree sufficed to represent any relations of origin or cause. An arbor de 
origine juris et legum, for example, classified all law in the form of a tree with 
numerous branches ... From the causal point of view, symbolism appears as 
a sort of short-circuit of thought ... all mental association based on any casual 
similitude whatever will immediately set up the idea of an essential and 
mystic connexion.21 
Still, there is structure other than the causal, which can be worthwhile but 
difficult to investigate. Some trees, at least, summarise genuine information. 
One is the logical diagram known as Porphyry's Tree, which classifies the kinds 
of being. In accordance with Stigler's Law of Eponymy,22 this is not due to 
Porphyry, but to one of his Latin translators, at the latest Boethius.23 
A tree diagram (fig. 4) which, unlike Porphyry's Tree, is for the 
classification of something more or less useful, is the division of the kinds of 
proportion in Pacioli's Summa de arithmetica, of 1494.24 Pacioli notes that the 
diagram continues indefinitely off the bottom of the page. The modern 
mathematician is unlikely to find any but the top few levels of any assistance in 
understanding ratios, but the basic plan is reasonable enough. 
Some historical perspective may be gained by noting that diagrams of 
essentially the same type have since proved widely useful in the sciences. 'Tree 
of life' diagrams are important in Darwin's early notebooks, for example.25 In 
this century, there are theorems in logic like 'the propositional calculus is a 
distributive lattice', 'diagram-chasing' in category theory,26 and 'semantic net' 
or 'frame' representations in artificial intelligence.27 'Venn' diagrams (due to 
Euler28) rely on the fact that the transitive relation of set inclusion is represented 
geometrically by the obviously transitive relation of containment of areas. 
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Figure 4. Pacioli's Classification of Ratios. 
Networks of nodes and connections, which are in general more complicated 
than trees in that they contain cycles, can be very useful in analysing 
telecommunications links, games and so on. The first mathematically 
sophisticated use of such a network was in Vandermonde's study of the knight's 
tour in chess, in 1771.29 He used the nodes to represent positions of the knight, 
and connected with a line those nodes which can be reached from one another 
by a legal knight's move. It is clear, then, that the medievals were essentially 
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correct in seeing tree diagrams as suitable for the representation of abstract 
structure. 
1.4 Diagrams Of Everything 
Space is three-dimensional. Diagrams can use all three dimensions, if someone 
is prepared to pay for the extra cost. If the money is there, they can also be very 
big. The iconography of the medieval church is inventive in detail, but 
standardised in plan: the cycles of frescos are a diagram of the history of the 
universe, also of the life of Christ, also of the pilgrimage of the individual soul. 
The cycles end at the back wall, on reaching which one is intended to impose 
a logical IF-THEN-ELSE structure: IF the soul chooses virtue, THEN go to 
the top part of the wall, and view the delights of paradise; ELSE, see the lurid 
detail below. 
It is possible to use spatial relations to suggest to the viewer parallels 
between different stories: between the life of Christ and the life of the Virgin, 
for example, whose cycles sometimes appear on the same wall at different 
levels. The Church of St Francis at Assisi uses the same device to suggest 
parallels between the life of Christ and that of St Francis.3D 
One cannot avoid noticing that Dante's heaven and hell are topographically 
very complex, compared with the simple Biblical entities of the same name, or 
even with the most elaborate Biblical described spaces, the Ark and the New 
JerusalemY 
More abstruse possible structural parallels, such as the Globe Theatre's 
alleged representation of the universe,32 remain somewhere in the limbo between 
the speculative and the proved. It can at least be said that the medieval and 
Renaissance mind would have regarded a complex building that did not 
represent the zodiac, or the virtues, or the macrocosm, or all of these at once, 
as a crying waste of representational possibilities. 
When funds did not permit grandiose construction, there was always the 
human body available for moralising as a diagram or 'microcosm' of the 
universe.33 
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1.5 Graphs 
Graphs, as in graphs of yearly profits, daily temperatures and the like, are one 
of the few mathematical inventions since ancient times that are needed to read 
the newspapers. The important thing in reasoning with a graph is that at least 
one of the dimensions should represent a quantity that is not spatial. Most 
commonly, the horizontal axis is reserved for time, and the vertical axis for 
some quantity that varies with respect to time, such as profits, temperature, or 
the distance travelled by a falling body. Graphs appear to be an invention of 
Oresme, about 1350, earlier diagrams that look something like graphs being 
only maps of purely spatial quantities. His horizontal axes can represent time 
or space, and his vertical axes any quantity that varies in intensity, such as 
velocity, intensity of colour, or joy. But his graphs have no scales on the axes: 
he is solely concerned with the differences in the shapes of different graphs.34 
A printed edition of 1486 is liberal with the diagrams.35 
Consider a graph with time on the horizontal axis and pitch (of sound) on 
the vertical axis. Discretize both axes; that is, cut up time and pitch into 
suitable intervals. Then one has, in effect, musical notation. The staff, invented 
in about the eleventh century, provides a scale for the vertical axis.36 Despite 
Oresme's musical interests, it seems unlikely that he saw any connection 
between musical notation and graphs; if he had, he would surely have put 
scales on the axes of his graphs. 
The usual 'Renaissance' gap in the development of science is evident with 
graphs, which appear to have had no use until 1600. Then their time came 
(surely it is the Wheel). GaWeo's discovery of the uniform acceleration of free 
fall involved essential reference to a graph. At first, he drew a diagram of an 
inclined plane which pictured only spatial quantities. In such a diagram, there 
is no place for the time variable, making it difficult to reason about time. 
Galileo was misled by it into thinking that the speed of a falling body is 
~roportional to the distance it has travelled from rest. Later, he drew almost 
:rre same diagram, but with one axis now representing time, and arrived at the 
':0ITcct conclusion: that speed is proportional to the time from rest, and hence 
':i~ tance travelled proportional to the square of the timeY 
\\ lllle Galileo is not thought to have read Oresme, the evidence is 
~ -.;;:-whelming that he did read certain printed books which incorporated 
C~=-;;3::r.c·S ideas. In particular. one can find antecedents of Galileo's graphical 
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proof of the 'Merton mean speed theorem' (that in uniformly accelerated 
motion, the distance travelled is equal to the distance that would be travelled 
by a body with uniform velocity equal to half the maximum velocity of the 
original accelerated body38). 
1.6 Tables 
Academics, especially at exam time, become very aware of the importance of 
'setting out', that is, the arrangement of pieces of information in a spatial 
pattern that allows the information to be grasped easily. Simple uses of space 
like indentation of new paragraphs, blank lines between sections, justification 
of type, headings in large type (or illuminated capitals) can reduce the reader's 
cognitive load remarkably.39 The main principle is that a spatial division, such 
as a blank line, should correspond to a major division in the text's meaning. 
Similar considerations apply to tables of figures. While a table is not precisely 
a kind of diagram, it is not unlike the 'negative' of a tree diagram: blanks, 
rather than lines, represent the relations between parts. 
A page from a book of accounts, such as that of Impyn's textbook,40 is 
notable in several geometrical ways. It is not all text; in fact half of it is empty 
space. The text comes in aligned blocks, and (besides the sums of money) there 
are also important non-text items, like lines, crossings-out, and marginal 
numbers indexing where the entries in the journal have been transferred into 
the more permanent ledger. All of these things might be different; if they were, 
making the inferences about the state of the owner's finances would be much 
more difficult. (These inventions are not sixteenth century; they are all visible 
in fourteenth-century accounts.41 ) 
The neat tables of the accountants can give the impression that Renaissance 
statistical information is generally arranged to allow perspicuous inference about 
it. This is far from true. Nef records the experience of trying to get a picture of 
the increase of coal shipments in England in the period after 1550.42 The Public 
Record Office contains hundreds of port books with entries about coal 
shipments, but separating them from those dealing with glass, salt and so on is 
an exercise for the modern researcher. That is, the records are a mass of items 
of information, but contain no suitable setting out of what it means; of 
statistical summaries, in modern language. The modern user of spreadsheets will 
notice that the account books, themselves much more sophisticated in these 
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matters than the public records, contain places for ' totals', but none for 
'averages' . And no bar graphs or pie charts, either. 
Tables of compound interest were produced by the fourteenth century 
Italian merchants,43 and for some time thereafter were regarded generally as 
trade secrets. Stevin produced the first printed tables.44 
Astronomy was, as usual, rather in advance. The Alfonsine tables are ruled 
very neatly.45 Astronomical tables differ from accounts in that they are 
projections onto the discrete realm, so to speak, of something continuous. 
Inference with them needs to keep in mind that they tabulate only a succession 
of points in a motion that is really continuous. Such inference is essential to 
Napier's invention of logarithms, about 1600. One can learn logarithms from a 
purely numerical point of view, as a set of rules about how to manipulate 
numerals, but that was not how Napier thought. Trained in spherical 
trigonometry for the calculation of astronomical tables, he actually defined 
logarithms in terms of moving points on continuous scales.46 
The spatial organisation of text to facilitate a grasp of its meaning will shade 
off into considerations of punctuation, which improved markedly in late 
medieval times,47 and such matters as decimals and algebraic notation in 
mathematics (to both of which Stevin made notable contributions). Interesting 
as these matters are, they would take us too far afield. 
We now move on to diagrams whose geometry represents something which 
is literally geometrical itself. The material here is generally better known than 
are the more abstract kinds of diagrams just considered. Here, we will briefly 
survey the field, calling attention to the reasoning processes needed to 
interpret the pictures. 
1. 7 Scientific Illustrations 
Drawings of machines are particularly interesting, from the point of view of 
reasoning, because the viewer has to infer how the machine works. To work is, 
among other things, to change over time, and neither time nor change can 
appear in the diagram. (In principle, it is possible to draw a series of diagrams 
representing the phases, as is often done in showing how a car piston works, or 
as the Bayeux tapestry shows the Battle of Hastings; pre-modem machine 
diagrams do not attempt this, and in any case, one must understand a single 
diagram of such a series reasonably well before being able to infer how it 
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changes to the next.) Nor can the diagram explicitly show forces and their 
transmission, or the direction in which a part is intended to move. The difficulty 
of the exercise is shown by the fact that it is usually impossible to discover how 
a machine works from a photograph of it. 
An added difficulty with interpreting diagrams of machines is that one has 
to infer their 3D structure from a 2D picture. Techniques of perspective drawing 
were useful, after their invention, but are neither necessary nor sufficient for a 
clear diagram. They are not necessary, since there are other ways of including 
all the essential information, like drawing sections, or flat diagrams that one 
imagines folded. They are not sufficient, since a perspective drawing that is of 
the outside of a machine lacks the working parts entirely, while a perspective 
projection of everything will normally be too cluttered to understand. 
Ancient and medieval machine diagrams have been unfairly disparaged 
because the conventions by which they solve these problems differ from the 
modern ones. The few surviving ancient diagrams of pulleys, war machines and 
the like, are reasonably easy to interpret, though they are neither exactly 
perspective nor plan views: each part is shown from its own most natural view-
point.48 For the modern viewer, the convention is initially confusing, but not 
hard to learn. It simply requires some mental origami to rotate the parts suitably. 
Islamic and medieval drawings use the same convention,49 and it is only replaced 
by more modern perspective-based techniques in the fifteenth century. 50 
Medical illustrations do not have the problem of the time dimension (until 
one begins to think of the heart as a pump). But a body is much harder to 
understand by looking at it than a machine is, being more complex, and largely 
invisible when in working order. So medical illustrations have serious problems 
in showing internals, and simplifying enough to show the main structure, or 
separate different kinds of structure. Here the convention of cut away diagrams 
was essential. The perfection of Leonardo and Vesalius51 should not blind us 
from perceiving that the essentials are present in Guido da Vigevano's 
Anathomia, ofthe 1340s.52 There seems to be some connection with anatomical 
models.53 
Printing obviously has something to do with the spread of scientific 
illustrations. But the excitement over Gutenberg (or Koster, or whoever) can 
make one forget the fact (which of course one knows, when reminded) that he 
did not invent printing itself, but only printing with movable type (an invention 
which itself needs-indeed consists in-a basic act of spatial imagination). 
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Movable type is only useful for printing text, especially in alphabetic languages. 
Printing of pictures came first, and was reasonably common in Europe from 
about 1400.54 Again, the path to the perfection of the art in Durer is one of 
evolution, not revolution. 
Edgerton, in arguing for the importance of scientific illustration in the 
Scientific Revolution, usefully juxtaposes some European machine diagrams 
with Chinese copies of them. At first glance, the copies are reasonable, but it 
is soon clear that the Chinese artist has misunderstood the diagrams at exactly 
the places where inference is required. Where a rope carrying tension is shown 
in a cut away section, and a continuation is shown in another part of the 
diagram, for example, the Chinese copy does not have the two parts collinear.55 
Mahoney, replying to Edgerton's thesis, points to the crucial role of algebra in 
the work of, for example, Huygens and Newton.56 True as that is, Mahoney's 
examples are from a different period. The later phase of the Scientific 
Revolution is indeed algebraic, but the earlier one is diagrammatic. 
Modern research on cross-cultural psychology has tended to confirm that 
there are major differences in how cultures perceive pictures, although 
research has concentrated on cultures that differ from the Western more than 
does the Chinese.57 
1. 8 Plan and Elevation 
A building poses different drafting problems to a machine. It typically has more 
detail, but it is conveniently hollow. More importantly, most buildings are 
approximately rectangular prisms, so most of the information on their 3D shape 
can be incorporated in three 2D diagrams, their 'plan' and two 'elevations'. 
Not much is known about ancient plans, though there are such things as 
scale drawings of Greek temples, and construction lines can sometimes be seen 
on the actual buildings. 58 Not a great deal is known about medieval building 
plans either, but there is enough to show that reasoning with plans was a 
normal part of cathedral building. There is a suggestion that making inferences 
about a building from plan and elevation was part of the famous 'secrets' of the 
masons.59 It is interesting that the Rheims Palimpsest, of about 1250, which is 
one of the very few surviving early plans, sketches one half of the elevation in 
detail, and the other only roughly. The artist knows about using symmetry for 
inference.6O 
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The Renaissance classic on architecture is Alberti's On Building. It well 
explains the difference between a plan and a picture: 
The difference between the drawings of a painter and those of the architect 
is this: the former takes pains to emphasize the relief of objects in paintings 
with shading and diminishing lines and angles; the architect rejects shading, 
but takes his projections from the ground plan, and, without altering the lines 
and by maintaining the true angles, reveals the extent and shape of each 
elevation and side-he is the one who desires his work to be judged not by 
deceptive appearance but according to certain calculated standards.61 
That is, the inference in the case of plans is performed consciously. 
The requirements of plan and elevation are, it must be emphasised, opposite 
in a way Alberti does not mention to those of a sketch which 'looks like' its 
object. The plan and elevation of a cube are both just squares, which are not 
very informative about the three-dimensional structure. To get a sketch of a 
cube that does convey the shape at a glance one should take a view from a 
'generic' angle; that is, one that bears no special relationship to the edges of 
the cube.62 It is notable that the stylised pictures of buildings and cities in the 
backgrounds of Byzantine and early medieval paintings take such a generic 
view (without being very expert in getting the angles right).63 
1.9 Maps and Projections 
A map, like an anatomical diagram, will simplify, select and label to facilitate 
inference (whether true or false ).64 
Medieval mappaemundi are more like diagrams, in the sense of the London 
Underground map, than maps drawn to scale, or according to a definite 
projection.65 Some of them are combined with Wheels of Fortune, to illustrate 
conditions on earth,66 and various other purposes can dominate the purely 
spatial information. Matthew Paris's itinerary map of the journey to the Holy 
Land is spatial, but essentially one-dimensional: it draws a road with icons of 
towns indicating the stages of the journey.67 
Conceiving of a map as unlike a simple picture suggests the idea of adding 
something to it to indicate such spatial relations as direction. Latitude and 
longitude were reasonably familiar to the Arabs and medievals, but more in 
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connection with the time differences between places than in drawing maps. 
Grids on maps are first found in diagrams of the planetary motions against the 
star background.68 
The idea of a projection is especially important for inference from maps. 
The maker of a world map must understand some way of projecting round 
onto flat, and the user must understand it well enough to infer back from flat 
to round. Roger Bacon explains the need for a projection: 
Since these climates [i.e. , zones] and the famous cities in them cannot be 
clearly understood by mere words, our sense must be aided by a figure. In the 
first place, then, I shall give a drawing of this quarter with its climates, and I 
shall mark the famous cities in their localities by their distance from the 
equinoctial circle, which is called the latitude of the city or region; and by the 
distance from the west or east, which is called the longitude of the region.69 
There follows a scheme of projection where the spacing of parallels decreases 
systematically towards the Pole. Projections became much better understood 
with the rediscovery of Ptolemy's work in the fifteenth century,7° and in the 
sixteenth, Mercator discovered his famous projection. Apart from aggrandising 
the circumpolar powers, its advantage is that of allowing the direction between 
any two places to be inferred directly from the map. 
The inferring of directions is also the point of the fourteenth-century 
portolan charts, which were practical aids for navigation. These include accurate 
maps of the Mediterranean coast, criss-crossed by many rhumb lines, which one 
follows with the eye to work out the directions between the important locations. 
Some also have compass roses and scales.71 Navigation involves difficult geo-
metrical reasoning, as one must mentally co-ordinate three different spaces: 
that of a chart, that of an instrument, and that of the surrounding actual space. 
A great deal of effort was expended on the subject, in view of the costs of 
mistakes. 
Local maps for legal and administrative purposes were occasionally found 
in the middle ages, but seem not to have been the normal thing until after 
1500.72 Hence, it seems that in general the ability to read maps and plans 
belonged only to certain specialised professions before about 1500, but became 
more general thereafter. Alberti describes how to construct a plan of Rome 
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using an odometer and triangulation; surveying as a standard practice is also 
common after 1500, but not before.73 
1.10 Instmments 
Diagrams are not necessarily drawn on paper. For purposes of use, it may be 
better to inscribe them on something more durable, like metal. For making the 
inferences, it may be useful to include moving parts. The most impressive of 
the common instruments at the time was the astrolabe, useful for measuring 
anything from the position at sea to heights of towers. It is an analogue 
computing device, in the same sense as a slide rule is: it represents various 
continuously varying quantities by lengths on the instrument, and makes 
inferences back from the instrument to the quantities represented.74 
One can have diagrams of the universe that incorporate the time dimension 
by having moving parts. There is a single ancient example, the Antikythera 
mechanism,75 and various medieval 'equatories'.16 If the mechanism is automated, 
it will become more and more like a clock. The earliest mechanical clocks of 
which there are reasonably complete descriptions are the complicated mid-
fourteenth century planetary models of Richard of Wallingford and Giovanni 
de Dondi, which also happen to tell the time. The image of the universe as a 
clock, which we think of as so much an emblem of the Scientific Revolution, 
is an idea of Oresme77 (though the phrase mundi machina is already in 
Sacrobosco's Sphere78). 
Clocks provide the public with extensive training in spatial reasoning, since 
they pose a difficult three-way co-ordination problem. The circular space of 
the dial, actual (linear) time, and the numerals must be mentally identified. 
The addition of a minute hand makes the problem even worse, since the dial 
must be read as two spaces, one for each hand. No wonder it takes forever to 
teach a child to tell the time.79 
All these diagrams are circular, as is one of Oughtred's original slide rules of 
1632, and Galileo's 'geometrical and military compass', which is an analogue 
calculating device more than a compass.80 'Mathematics' did not have the 
suggestion of an abstract subject divorced from reality that it has today, but was 
much more closely associated with practical skills with a variety of 
instruments.81 
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Figure 5. Stevin 's Wreath of Spheres. 
1.11 Forces 
A central place in the medieval applications of geometry was held by the 
science of weights, as classically expounded by Jordanus Nemorarius in his 
thirteenth-century treatise. His derivation of the law of the lever is interesting 
in that, unlike Archimedes, he relies on 'virtual displacements ': he 
demonstrates that weights are in equilibrium by considering the movements 
they would undergo if they were not. The movements with which he calculates 
exist only in the imagination.82 
It is the science of weights that includes one of the earliest actual discoveries 
of the Scientific Revolution, a successful application of reasoning with a 
diagram. In 1586 Stevin printed the 'Wreath of Spheres' diagram (fig. 5) as the 
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title page of his Elements of the Art of Weighing. 83 The text which decorates it 
says, approximately, 'Wonderful, but not incomprehensible', which it is. It is 
clear that the circle of balls does not tend to rotate either clockwise or 
anticlockwise. But the balls hanging below the horizontal line are in 
equilibrium. One could cut them in the middle, and allow them to hang down, 
or even remove them altogether, without disturbing the balls resting on the two 
inclined planes. These upper balls, then, are at rest. The numbers of balls on 
each side of the apex are in inverse proportion to the sine of the angles at 
which the planes are inclined. One has derived, therefore, the law of the 
inclined plane, or, equivalently, the resolution of forces into components.84 
From the point of view of this paper, it is important that this, probably the only 
significant discovery of the early Scientific Revolution concerning forces, is 
expressed as pure geometry. 
There seem to be no medieval or early modern diagrams that represent 
forces by arrows (even in the sections on stresses in beams in Galileo's Two 
New Sciences where one is almost forced to imagine arrows85). Nevertheless, 
someone who can design a flying buttress must have some mental 
representation of the direction of stresses;86 likewise Brunelleschi in 
understanding that the hemispherical dome of the Cathedral of Florence could 
be constructed without scaffolding, a feat impossible with an arch.87 Cannon 
and crossbows redirect forces, but it may have been possible to design and use 
them without imagining the forces. On the other hand, it is surely impossible 
to tack into the wind88 without keeping constantly in mind the relations 
between the wind direction and the angle of the sails. 
1.12 Euclid's Geometry 
The history of geometry, in the formal sense, is a well-worn topic, and here we 
may just select a few aspects that are especially relevant to the thesis of the 
article. 
As is well known, Euclid's reasoning cannot be carried out purely in terms 
of propositions, but relies essentially on the diagrams.89 Kant is only the most 
famous of many who have been greatly impressed by the indispensability of 
'constructions' in geometrical reasoning.90 In Book I, proposition 1 Euclid 
draws a line, and then two circles with centres on the ends of the line and with 
radius equal to the length of the line, as in fig. 6. He next considers the points 
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Figure 6. Euclid I.1. 
where the circles interest. He does not use any axiom to justify the fact that 
they do intersect, but simply infers that from the diagram. 
The intrinsic importance of whatever is in the early propositions of Euclid is 
magnified a thousandfold, as far as the history of ideas is concerned, by the 
central place the Elements has played in Western education since about 1200.91 
The pedagogical profession, to its lasting credit, held firm on Euclid (at least 
until around 1960), despite the immense consumer resistance that has left us the 
phrase pons asinorum (Euclid 1.5).92 A whole civilisation followed Euclid across 
that narrow bridge, into a bright new land of expanded horizons of the intellect. 
The transferability of the skills learned with Euclid is of course an issue for 
debate, as it is when any modern mathematics educator demands more money 
on the grounds that 'mathematics teaches you to think'. Nevertheless, those 
involved seem to have had little doubt about the usefulness of geometrical 
training. Ramelli, for example, in his profusely illustrated book of 1588 on 
ingenious machines, praises Euclid at length; a modern commentator cannot 
understand the point of this, when Ramelli does not actually use any Euclidean 
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theorems.93 The answer must be, as it is to the modern question about the 
usefulness of training in abstract mathematics, that the more intelligent the 
pupil, the more transferable his skills, while even the most intelligent of pupils 
cannot be expected to recapitulate the history of mathematical discovery on his 
own. (Interestingly, the case for the usefulness of training in logic is much 
weaker.94 While it is not impossible that training in formal logic should prove 
useful-as happened in the 1940s during the development of computers-there 
seems no reason to think that the immense effort the medievals put into formal 
logic had any input into the Scientific Revolution.) 
Nevertheless, while there is a certain amount of agreement that the West's 
possession of Euclid was important,95 there is room for confusion on what that 
means. For Euclid represents two very different things: logical rig our, and 
geometry. Philosophers emphasise the ideal of rigorous proof, according to 
which Euclid fulfils the goal set for all science by Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, 
of a set of theorems deduced from self-evident axioms. That is the aspect of 
Euclid that Matteo Ricci saw as lacking in Chinese mathematics: 
Nothing pleased the Chinese as much as the volume on the Elements of 
Euclid. This perhaps was due to the fact that no people esteem mathematics 
as highly as the Chinese, despite their method of teaching, in which they 
propose all kinds of propositions but without demonstrations. The result of 
such a system is that anyone is free to exercise his imagination relative to 
mathematics without offering a definitive proof of anything.96 
That is, Chinese geometry lacks the discipline of rigorous inference. Modern 
studies have found that indeed mathematics in traditions that do not descend 
from the Greeks, though often excellent at developing complicated algorithms, 
is almost entirely lacking in proof.97 Non-western mathematics resembles 
modern computer programming much more than it resembles modern 
mathematics. But, though the ideal of rigour is exciting, it is not obviously 
useful for anything outside geometry. For all the talk about axioms and 
certainty, no other science was put on an axiomatic basis, nor were there even 
any serious attempts. Not even the sciences closest to geometry became 
axiomatised: Ptolemy'sAlmagest has no self-evident axioms, and there is hardly 
a proof in number theory between Diophantus and Fermat, let alone an axiom. 
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Still less are there any medieval or Renaissance attempts like Spinoza's to 
develop ethics, for example, more geometrico. 
On the other hand, Euclid represents geometry, understood as reasoning 
about spatial magnitudes and shapes. Here, the evidence is clearer for the 
usefulness of geometrical training. There was a medieval tradition of 'practical 
geometry' that depends on Roman surveying techniques and pre-dates the 
influence of the translations of Euclid. 98 Nevertheless, it was already 
consciously about inference: 'Practical [geometry] is that which is done by 
certain instruments and by inferring (coniciendo) proportionally one [distance] 
from others'.99 When Euclid did become available, the practical geometries 
incorporated some of his ideas. Thus, even those interested only in the practical 
applications of geometry were encouraged to take some interest in reasoning. 
The widely-discussed medieval split between theory and practice, while genuine 
enough in general, is probably at its narrowest in geometry.lOO This is important, 
if the view is taken that a necessary condition for a scientific revolution is a 
feedback loop between theoretical science and technological innovation. 
A sign of how deeply Euclid penetrated is the non-trivial use made of it by 
Bartolus, the foremost medieval authority in law, a discipline legendary for its 
innumeracy. Bartolus wrote a book applying Euclid to the division of lands 
affected by flooded rivers; it remains one of the few legal books with 
geometrical diagrams.lol He also indulges in some simple optical reasoning: 'I 
saw Titius in the mirror at the barber shop, and recognised him' is not 
completely certain evidence that I saw Titius, because an image in a mirror is 
smaller than the thing, and so harder for the eye to discern.102 
Yet, there are several respects in which Euclid is unsatisfactory as a training 
in spatial reasoning. For one thing, the proofs are difficult, so difficult that 
struggling through them can make learning the actual geometry very slow 
going. Secondly, the geometry of the Elements is almost all two-dimensional. It 
is true that Euclid knew some three-dimensional geometry, and something 
about how to represent it in two dimensions, as is clear from the diagram of 
parallelepipeds (fig. 7) from the oldest manuscript.103 
But three-dimensional geometry occupies only small portions of the text, 
and they are in the little-read later books. This is a pity, as the difficulties of 
applying geometry to optics or astronomy or architecture lie mainly in coping 
with the third dimension. Finally, there is no motion; Euclid does not train the 
reader in what happens when shapes move, and avoids methods of proof that 
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Figure 7. Euclid XI.31, from The 'Heiberg' Manuscript. 
involve, for example, superimposing one figure on another. 'Geometry is 
occupied with immobile magnitude', Hugh of St Victor says, but adds, 
'astronomy with mobile'. 104 Astronomy supplied all the other lacks in Euclid, 
too. 
1.13 Astronomy 
The standard introduction to astronomy in the university curriculum from 
about 1300 to 1600 was one of the best-written textbooks ever, the Sphere of 
Sacrobosco. The Sphere was the book on which Copernicus received his 
training on celestial orbs and their revolutions. It explains the celestial spheres, 
the zodiac, equinoxes and solstices, eccentrics and epicycles (very briefly) in a 
way that is always concise, clear and to the point. It expects of its readers a 
considerable willingness to imagine in three dimensions, but rewards average 
persistence with genuine understanding. Its strengths are illustrated by the two 
definitions of a sphere, which open the first chapter: 
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A sphere is thus described by Euclid: A sphere is the transit of the 
circumference of a half-circle upon a fixed diameter until it revolves back to 
its original position. That is, a sphere is such a round and solid body as is 
described by the revolution of a semi-circular arc. 
By Theodosius a sphere is described thus: A sphere is a solid body contained 
within a single surface, in the middle of which there is a point from which all 
straight lines drawn to the circumference are equal, and that point is called 
the 'center of the sphere' .105 
A diagram on paper is no use here: the reader must construct one in his 
imagination. Anyone who has done so and understood that the two definitions 
are equivalent has learned something substantial about modelling in the 
imagination. 
Some of the later portions of the book are helped by illustrations. The 
edition of Venice, 1485, prints an eclipse diagram in three colours. Many ofthe 
sixteenth-century printed editions had sheets of volvelles to be cut out and 
pasted in.106 
The capacity to visualise the universe from different points of view was not 
restricted to professional astronomers. The round earth itself required some 
work in the imagination for everyone: Madeville's Travels explains that the 
inhabitants of the southern hemisphere are upside down, to us, but seem to 
themselves to be the right way Up. J07 (As far as is known, no other civilisation 
"as asked to contemplate such a thing of other peoples.) There is something 
similar in the Divine Comedy,108 a work generally heavy with geometry-its last 
thirteen lines contain a geometer, a circle, an image, the (faculty of) phantasy, 
and astronomical revolutions.109 Dante imagines looking down from the sphere 
of the fixed stars and seeing the northern hemisphere from Cadiz to Asia. l1O 
\\"e might think of it as a NASA's-eye view,lll and see a connection between it 
3.nd a good deal of later speculation about what is 'out there';112 in any case, it 
i ~ exactly the view shown in the map in Ptolemy's Cosmographia of 1482, which 
~~e5 some interesting techniques to make the spherical shape of the earth 
:,:-\·ious.,L' Edgerton remarks, 'Only by this kind of three-dimensional mind's-
=y= imagining could [Columbus] convince himself, as well as others, that it 
·.':" ..:<ld be possible to reach the East by sailing west'.u4 It would be possible to 
=:'':LI 3. brge thesis concerning the effect on Western thought of the 'what if? ' 
78 JAMES FRANKLIN 
style of counterfactual imagining, implicating everyone from the Pre-Socraticsll5 
to science fiction, and no doubt such a thesis would be as defensible as ones of 
comparable size on religion and the rise of capitalism and the like. 'Here's fine 
revolution, an we had the trick to see't' (Hamlet Y.i.89). 
Since we are speaking of revolutions, it is pertinent to observe that the use 
of this astronomical metaphor to describe any major change is a medieval 
idea.116 
So, when we speak of the 'heritage of Greek geometry', we should keep in 
mind not only Euclid, but Parmenides (or his contemporary), who first 
concluded the earth was round from a leap of geometrical imagination,117 and 
Hipparchus, who fitted the numerical data of the Greeks and Babylonians to a 
geometrical schemeYs Astronomy has had a wide sphere of influence. 
1.14 Optics and Perspective 
Perspective in painting is an even more well-worn topic than geometry, and 
again we select just those aspects most relevant to spatial inference. 
Geometrical optics, including the theory of vision, was, as is well-known, one 
of the best developed of medieval sciences.119 The books of Alhazen, Bacon, 
Grosseteste, Witelo and Pecham are as scientifically sophisticated as anything 
the medievals produced. Optics include possibly the high point of medieval 
science, Theodoric of Freiberg's explanation of the rainbow (which depends 
essentially on a diagram).l2° 
Books on perspective still sometimes read as if perspective sprang fully 
formed from the head of Brunelleschi.121 This is ridiculous from the point of 
view of geometrical reasoning, and also from the point of view of illusionistic 
art. The rules of perspective are a marvellous discovery, but they are of the 
same sort as a number of earlier and simpler ones. (Giotto was 'the inventor 
and discoverer of many methods which had been buried for about six hundred 
years', according to Ghiberti.122 The best one or two surviving antique 
perspective paintings do seem to justify the claims that the ancients knew some 
geometrical rules;123 Giotto should have had little trouble reverse engineering 
them.) Consider the view of a ceiling with rafters in fig. 8. 
Five lines in different directions, all converging, are more than a 
coincidence; the artist clearly knows something about how to represent three 
dimensions in two. The artist in question did not have the benefit of 
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Figure 8. Duccio 's 'Perspective'. 
Brunelleschi's and Alberti's tuition, as he lived a century earlier. The view is 
from Duccio's Maesta of 1308-11;124 he repeats it a number of times, as does 
Giotto, who on one ceiling has eleven converging lines, all in slightly different 
directions.125 Duccio also has a complicated array of boxes seen from a generic 
angle, with the angles correct. Giotto draws the circular rims of jars seen from 
an angle as ellipses. 126 In these cases, the ellipses are rather flat, and could as 
well be lozenge shapes. This is not the case, however, with the quite wide 
ellipses Giotto uses to represent circles in his coretti in the Arena Chapel, 
perhaps the first genuine trompe l'oeil, at least since antiquity,127 
The history of ellipses makes an interesting microcosm of the thesis of this 
paper. Ellipses are, in theory, fully treated in Apollonius' Conics, but as that 
work is almost impossible to read, they had only a marginal role in geometry 
in the tradition of Euclid's Elements.!28 They have little part in practical 
geometry either, which is based on straight rules and strings, and compasses. 
But in ancient painting, it was well-known that a shield or wheel seen side-on 
should be drawn as an ellipse, and theorem 36 of Euclid's Optics says that a 
wheel is seen sometimes as a circle, sometimes as an ellipse.129 The ellipse 
belongs more to 'perspective'130 than to formal geometry until its scientific 
apotheosis in Kepler's planetary theory. The method of constructing an ellipse 
with a string stretched between two pins was mentioned by Anthemius of 
Tralles, the architect of Hagia Sophia, and investigated by Kepler. Kepler opens 
his New Astronomy with a lament that is hard to find suitably prepared readers, 
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as hardly anyone works through Apollonius, so that few can understand 
diagrams well. l3l 
The most obvious way in which Giotto's and Duccio's 'perspective' differs 
from the real thing, as in the fifteenth-century masters, is that the earlier 
painters are not prepared to make the lines orthogonal to the picture plane 
long, with the result that they cannot have their perspective scheme covering 
the whole painting. They do not attempt real depth for the whole scene: there 
is, for example, always a blank wall preventing the rafters from continuing into 
the picture away from the viewer, covering the vanishing point (the 
'perspective fig-Ieaf'). 
One of the things necessary to make this step-arguably the main one, in 
view of the effort Alberti and his contemporaries make in explaining it-is a 
conscious, general method of foreshortening. Lines parallel to the picture plane 
must recede into the distance, with the distances between equally spaced real 
things (for example the edges of tiles) diminishing in the picture in geometrical 
proportion. A method of accomplishing this appears in Pietro Lorenzetti's Birth 
of the Virgin of 1342, which Kemp calls 'the tour de force of fourteenth-
century perspective'. It uses simply similar triangles, in much the same way as 
Alberti later describes; the construction lines can be traced incised in the wall 
in some parts.132 Some of the painters' methods of geometrical construction on 
walls are described in Cennini's handbook of the late fourteenth century.133 
The step from a collection of special tricks to a method of organising a whole 
picture requires the addition of geometrical theory. The part played by 
theoretical geometry and optics in the invention of perspective is not as clear 
as it might be, because neither Brunelleschi's two original perspective panels, 
nor his method of constructing them, has survived. It has been argued with at 
least some show of reason that he did not know any rules.134 But the oldest 
relevant written evidence, the treatises of Alberti and Ghiberti, are fully based 
on geometrical theory. Book I of Alberti's On Painting is entirely an exposition 
of geometry, though punctuated by claims that he speaks 'as a painter', not as 
a mathematician. All that means is that his lines have a finite width, unlike the 
abstract widthless lines of the mathematicians. In fact, he goes so far as to 
retain barely relevant theory from Euclid, such as the axion that 'all right 
angles are equal'.135 The point is to reason about what to draw in a painting: 
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Now, since we have said that the picture is a cross-section of the pyramid we 
ought to investigate what importance this cross-section has for us. Since we 
have these knowns, we now have new principles with which to reason about 
the plane from which we have said the pyramid issues.136 
What the reader is supposed to reason with is, in effect, an imagined three-
dimensional diagram, containing a pyramid of visual rays and a cross-section of 
it, the plane of the painting. There follows a set of recipes on what lines to draw 
on the picture plane. Alberti promises that he possesses demonstrations of the 
recipes from reasoning about the visual pyramid, but omits them 'for the sake 
of brevity'.137 The connection of early perspective with optical theory is even 
clearer in Ghiberti's Third Commentary, which is a series of extracts from the 
optical writings, especially Alhazen.138 Though Ghiberti did not write the 
Commentary until the 1450s, when he was old, he claims to have studied optics 
when young and still learning the art of painting. 139 
The various Renaissance treatises on perspective provide the best examples 
of genuinely applied mathematics of the time. They are highly theoretical, but 
universally recognised as successful in practice. 
An interesting application of optical reasoning in the Scientific Revolution 
itself is Galileo's reinvention of the telescope. He claims that the Dutch 
discovered it by accident, but that he, 'incited by the news mentioned above, 
discovered the same by means of reasoning'; that is, by reasoning as to what 
combination of convex and concave glasses would give a clear magnified 
image.14o 
1.15 The Mathematical Revolution 
The thematic survey of geometrical reasoning just undertaken has perhaps 
obscured the broad chronological outlines of the Mathematical Revolution 
which preceded the Scientific one. Let us briefly review the chronology, 
emphasising how much was geometry, in the broad sense. To begin with, the 
ancient inheritance was extremely geometrical: the three most successful 
ancient sciences (not counting geometry itself) were astronomy, optics and statics, 
which consisted of great super-structures of geometry anchored in only few 
and easily acquired observations.141 For later developments, a table (fig. 9) will 
provide the most perspicuous representation, as time is linear. Something that 
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PURE GEOMETRY OPTICS ASTRONOMY OTHER SPATIAL NUMERICAL 
1100 Latin Euclid, Music with staff 
Archimedes Compass, quadrant 
1200 Euclid in cuniculum Perspeclives Alfonsine tables Villard's sketchbook Arabic numerals 
Fibonacci's gcometty Glass minors Sacrobosco's Sphere Cathedral plans Fibonacci 
Jordanus on weights 
1300 Theodoric on rainbow Wallingford Portolan charts Double-entty 
Spectacles Chaucer's Astrolabe Oresme on graphs Insurance 
Giotto's "perspective" Merton "intension of fonns" Abacus schools 
Anatomical diagrams Dice calculations 
Vigevano: machine drawings 
Compound interest tables 
1400 Rules of perspective Leonardo's sketches 
Henry "the Navigator" 
1500 Italian, English Euclids Telescope Copernicus DUrer's illustrations Solution of cubic 
Brahe V esalius' ilIusttations Decimals 
Mercator's projection Viete's algebra 
Slevin's "wreath of spheres" Logarit\uns 
Figure 9. Table of developments. 
is clearer from the table than it would be from a mass of text is the clustering 
of applications of mathematics in the fourteenth century. The Scientific 
Revolution thus inherited a tradition of applying mathematics already two 
hundred years old. In some sense, it did not inherit much else of use-there 
was, for example, no comparable tradition of controlled experimentation. A 
glance at Grant's Source Book of Medieval Science shows that almost all 
medieval and Renaissance science is included in the above table, except for 
some depressing nonsense on matters like alchemy and herbs. 
A snapshot of the state of mathematics after the Mathematical Revolution, 
but at the very beginning of the Scientific Revolution, as usually calculated, can 
be found in Billingsley's Euclid, the first English translation, of 1570 (a book 
otherwise notable for its pop-up figures of 3D geometry142). It has a preface by 
John Dee, 'specifying the chief Mathematicall Sciences, what they are, and 
wherunto commodious'. He arranges in a tree the two principal sciences, 
arithmetic and geometry, and some thirty derivative sciences. There are 'vulgar' 
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arithmetic and 'vulgar' geometry, the latter divided into eleven sciences, 
concerned with surveying, in one, two and three dimensions, on both land and 
sea. Then there are nineteen miscellaneous sciences, most with a distinctly 
geometrical aspect. Of these, perspective, astronomy, music, cosmography, 
astrology, statics and navigation are clear enough, but the remaining eleven 
have names now unrecognisable. :Anthropographie' is about the proportions in 
the human body; 'Zographie' is something like the modern theory of rendering 
in computer graphics; 'Trochilike' studies circular motions, simple and 
compound; 'Hydragogie' 'demonstrateth the possible leading of Water by 
Natures Law, and by artificiall helpe, from any head' and 'Pneumatithmie' 
'demonstrateth by close hollow Geometrical figures (Regular and Irregular) 
the straunge properties (in motion or stay) or the Water, Ayre, Smoke and 
Fire'. Some of these are plainly more commodious unto nascent capitalism 
than others, but the total picture is of a suite of mathematical, mostly 
geometrical, sciences, in common and successful use, with investors queuing. 143 
One of the mathematical sciences that certainly did attract serious money was 
navigation. l 44 Military engineering was another steady earner. 145 Renaissance 
universities, for all the obloquy heaped on them, were also reliable sources of 
money for research into geometry, and especially astronomy (though not for 
algebra or non-medical experimental research).146 
The evidence is, then, that when all due allowance has been made for the 
religious, hermetic, scholastic, military, astrological, ancient, alchemical and 
mercantile roots of the Scientific Revolution, the true compost in which those 
roots struck and grew strong was mathematics, and especially applied geometry. 
2. THE VIEW FROM THE INSIDE 
'One must consider the affection which is produced in the sou~ and in that part of 
the body which contains the soul-the affection, the lasting state of which we call 
memory-as a kind of picture ': Aristotle147 
'There are no such things as mental pictures': Ryle148 
We live at the end of a period which, perhaps more than any other, has hidden 
the pictorial life of the mind from intellectual view. Philosophy in the mid-
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century regarded 'sense data' as fictions, arrived at by (bad) inference and 
suitable for disposal as an undergraduate exercise.149 It was seriously maintained 
that all inner representation was propositionaJ.l50 (That is philosophy in the 
English-speaking tradition, continental philosophy being, if anything, even 
more word-oriented.) Psychology in the behaviourist decades was not much 
concerned with any inner life, pictorial or not, and 'imagery' tended to be 
associated with the Gestalt school, labelled 'unscientific'. Introspection, despite 
being reproducible with reasonable consistency, was ruled out as a source of 
experimental data. Frege, Russell and Hilbert, followed by Turing and the 
computer scientists and Artificial Intelligentsia, imposed on the learned world 
a view of inference as the manipUlation of uninterpreted symbols according to 
formal rules. No room for pictures there. Even mathematics, once centred on 
geometry, maintained hardly any formal role for pictures, holding that 
geometrical intuition is unreliable. Galton was surprised to find even at the end 
of the nineteenth century that scientists were claiming to think in symbols, not 
images, and supposed that science had atrophied the imagination.151 It is true 
that in the physical sciences there has been a kind of tradition of remarks on the 
need for mental geometrical intuition, but it is one of those 'traditions' that 
presents itself as a novelty every time it is reinvented.152 At about the time Ryle 
was denying the reality of mental pictures, Einstein was saying: 
The words or the language, as they are written or spoken, do not seem to play 
any role in my mechanism of thought. The psychical entities which seem to 
serve as elements in thought are certain signs and more or less clear images 
which can be 'voluntarily' reproduced and combined .. . The above mentioned 
elements are, in my case, of visual and some of muscular type. Conventional 
words or other signs have to be sought for laboriously only in a secondary 
stage, when the mentioned associative play is sufficiently established and can 
be reproduced at will. 153 
Generally, though, the image was left to intellectual marginals: diagrammatic 
inference to the engineers, with their slide rules, flow charts and circuit 
diagrams, and mental images to the Freudians and their dream fantasies. 
The result is that the late-millennial intellectual has several layers of defence 
against accepting the medieval unselfconsciousness about using the imagination 
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as a tool for doing science. First, we doubt the existence of the inner life at all. 
Or, we regard it as reached only by a chain of inference, not open to view. Or, 
we regard it as vague, and primarily emotional, not precise and scientific. Or, 
we presume the 'stream of consciousness', if there is one, is a flow of words, the 
preserve of psychiatrists and novelists. Or, if we do take the visual side of the 
imagination seriously, we think of it as something like a muse, 'inspiring' artists 
and poets in a manner too sublime to analyse. We have every excuse for 
misunderstanding. 
At the leading edge of science, this picture is no longer true. Two 
developments especially have made the difference: psychological experiments 
on mental images, and scientific visualisation by computer. The psychological 
work is especially relevant. Around 1970, Shepard and Metzler found that the 
time subjects took to decide whether one 3D figure could be rotated to fit in the 
same space as another was proportional to the angle required, suggesting that 
the subjects were actually performing the rotation in some kind of mental 
space. 154 Since then, similar techniques have been used to investigate how 
subjects imagine themselves in an environment while mentally searching it,155 
and how they construct a mental model from a description of a scene.156 It is 
found generally that reasoning about space is done by means of mental models, 
not via chains of propositions.157 In view of what was said above about the 
importance of reasoning in three dimensions, it is significant that 3D imagining 
is found to be remarkably powerful: one can, for example, mentally scan across 
an imagined space from any viewpoint: the space is mentally encoded in 3D, 
but can be 'displayed' from any viewpoint in 2D.158 
The other development that has given images scientific respectability is the 
very recent availability of computer-intensive visualisation tools, used for such 
purposes as understanding complex fluid flows. 159 The images are not 
themselves mental, but of course the point of computer visualisation is to create 
pictures that lead to understanding, that is, cause suitable mental representations. 
To some extent, the two themes are connected by research in education, which 
finds that mental visualisation is a necessary skill for learning in the sciences.160 
Anyone with some sympathy for the idea that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny 
will be ready to look for some parallel process in the history of science. 
These developments are yet to flow through into general intellectual 
consciousness, but progress has been sufficient to assert, at least, that Aristotle 
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was more right than Ryle, and that there are no longer any barriers in principle 
to taking literally what the medievals were saying about mental images. 
These studies also encourage us to add some further subtleties to the photo/ 
line-drawing/diagram distinction drawn at the beginning of the paper. In order 
to infer something, whether from a diagram or from propositions, those entities 
must be represented internally, in the mind, soul or brain. In recent years some 
understanding has been reached of how this is done: put crudely, there is 
something like a picture inside; a kind of mental image which one can inspect. 
The image is, however, much more like a diagram than a photograph, in that it 
leaves out some things, while emphasising and labelling others.161 So it is not 
quite correct to distinguish sharply between an image and a 'model' or 
metaphor. 162 Because the image is labelled, it contains information about, and 
can replicate (some of) the structure of its object; and hence support inference 
about the object. Speaking in an older idiom, Albertus Magnus says that 
memory is the storehouse not of images alone, but also of the intentiones drawn 
from them by the estimative power, with the image including the intentio within 
itself.163 (Conversely, of course, from a purely physical point of view, photos, line 
drawings and diagrams are all just marks on paper. So to distinguish even them 
one must at least implicitly refer to the internal representation that they cause.) 
2.1 The History Of Mental Images: Phantasms, Memory Theatres And Visions 
We are now ready to see with new eyes the image-laden, text-poor world of the 
late medieval at his devotions. It is impossible not to speculate on the richness 
of the inner imaginal life of those fortunate to have viewed Fra Angelico or 
Giotto when newly painted. Fortunately, it is not necessary to be content with 
speculation, since those who did master text (surely a sample biased the wrong 
way) are eager to tell us in detail all about what it looked like inside. 
The ancient legacy of discussion on mental images was moderately 
rich-richer, certainly, that the available ancient store of actual diagrams, of 
perspective pictures, or of psychological writings generally. 'There is no 
thinking without an image'l64 is one of Aristotle's most quoted sayings, and his 
discussion of imagination posits physical entities like pictures in the sensory 
apparatus.165 Talk of 'phantasms', or mental images, is common currency in 
Stoic and Neoplatonist discussion of perception.166 If Augustine is not the 
discoverer of the inner life here to the same extent as he is with autobiography, 
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he certainly talked enthusiastically of inner images. He writes (the portion in 
italics is quoted in Aquinas' Summa Theologiae): 
The bodily sight cannot exist without the spiritual sight, because at the very 
moment when the bodily sense is touched by a body, there is made in the soul 
a something which is not this but is like it. If this were not produced, there 
would be no sense able to perceive those things which lie outside. For the body 
does not sense, but the soul through the body, which it uses as a messenger for 
reproducing within itself what is announced from without. 167 
He applies the expression 'the mind's eye' (oculus mentis) to a kind of 
intellectual vision. 168 The 'phantasm' occurs in the famous passage of Augustine 
where he anticipates Descartes' Cogito, ergo sum: 
But without any delusive representations of dreams and phantasms, I am most 
certain that I am ... For if I am deceived, I am.169 
The western scholastics, following Avicenna, produced a very elaborate, and 
widely-known, theory of the 'inward wits'. It involved five internal faculties, 
including the 'imagination', which stored images, and the 'phantasy' (English 
'fancy'), which recombined them.170 There was also a baroque population of 
entities like the impressed and expressed species in which the various faculties 
dealt, but the most crucial one was still the 'phantasm'. The startlingly physical 
view of mental images that the scholastics took is preserved in later discussions 
of the effect of a mother's imagination on the foetus: 
Now from many instances it is clear that the imagination of the parents has an 
extraordinary power to modify and inflect the tempering and the formative 
power. So, if it is extremely strong and intent, sometimes the figure of what is 
thought, even if quite alien, is induced in the foetus. Thus it sometimes 
happens that a black child is born of two white parents, because the mother 
was turning over in her imagination an Ethiopian which she had depicted to 
herself in the bedchamber ... Given that the imagination can exercise such 
force, it is difficult to explain it. One opinion is this: The mother apprehends 
with intent thought, say, the form of an Ethiopian, whose image she imprints 
on the spirits which are carried back into the passages of the brain. The spirits 
then act as a vehicle to carry the image to the place of conception, where it 
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imbues the material that the foetus is made from with the black colour that 
later appears. It so modifies the formative power inherent in the semen that 
what should make the foetus like the parents now makes it like the image, and 
so what happens is that the foetus degenerates into the form of an 
Ethiopian.17l 
(Before laughing about quaint views on the efficacy of mental images, one 
should perhaps recall that imagining walking increases the heart-rate. 172) 
There is a dark side to regarding images as real things, which the soul 
somehow 'has' or 'receives'. It is that one can start brooding over tlieu' source, 
and suspecting their veracity. From Augustine again: 
Whatever we perceive by the body, even when not present to the senses, may 
be present to the imagination, as when we are asleep or angry: yet we cannot 
discern by the senses, whether what we perceive be the sensible object, or the 
deceptive image thereof.173 
One will be particularly worried if one believes in dark forces whose mission is 
to deceive, like devils or witches. 
Both in bodily sights and the images of bodies which appear in the spirit, good 
spirits instruct and bad ones deceive.174 
The result of these speculations in the fevered imaginations of the witch 
inquisitors makes an alarming and depressing story, an illuminating case study 
on the effects to which mistakes in abstract thinking can lead.175 (Though on the 
other side the optical writer Witelo wrote a book On the Nature of Demons, 
attributing them to optical mistakes in bad light.176) Less harmful, but in 
principle much the same rationally, were beliefs in the efficacy of the 
imagination in Renaissance writings on magic and 'fascination'.177 
After that, the visual imagery (sic) in Shakespeare's sonnets reads less as the 
excesses of the poetical imagination (sic) than as sober science: 
Mine eye hath played the painter and hath stell'd 
Thy beauty's form in table of my heart 
My body is the frame wherin 'tis held 
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And perspective it is best painter's art. 
For through the painter must you see his skill 
To find where your true image pictured lies, 
Which in my bosom's shop is hanging still 
Since I left you mine eye is in my mind 
And that which governs me to go about 
Doth part his function and is partly blind, 
Seems seeing, but effectually is out, 
For it no form delivers to the heart 
Of bird, of flower, or shape, which it doth latch: 
Of his quick object hath the mind no part 
Nor his own vision holds what it doth catch. 
For some more Shakespearean science: 
Sonnet 24 
Sonnet 113178 
A foolish extravagant spirit, full of forms, figures, shapes, objects, ideas, 
apprehensions, motions, revolutions. These are begat in the ventricle of 
memory ... 179 
The references here to perspective and the theory of the internal senses are, it 
will be observed, not just decoration. They concentrate on perception as 
inference, with the possibility of that inference being faulty. 
Conversely, talk about the 'imagination' of poets still meant something 
literal. Philip Sidney'S Apology for Poetry explains that poetry is better than 
both philosophy and history, since the pictures it induces in the imagination 
have more force than the dry abstractions of philosophy, while still having a 
generality that the particular facts of history lack. He means by the 
'imagination', as usual, a faculty of visualising by recombining images.180 
Sidney occupies a place towards the end of a long tradition of connecting the 
activity of the poet with the exercise of the (literal) faculty of imagination. lSI 
So much for the vivid content of the medieval and Renaissance imagination. 
What was its purpose? In the first instance, it was for memory. Before memory 
was exported from the mind to written records, and the art of memory decayed, 
the geometrical resources of the visual imagination were used as a way of 
ordering any complicated body of ideas that had to be committed to memory, 
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such as a long speech. The invention of the art was ascribed to Simoni des of 
Ceos, who, leaving a banquet just before the dining hall collapsed, was able to 
identify the mangled bodies of the diners from the places where they lay; for he 
found he possessed a mental image of where the diners had been sitting.182 
From the start, a mental image was recognised as a structured entity, in which 
the relationship between the parts was useful for drawing conclusions. 
Simoni des' idea was taken up in the later antique and medieval 'art of memory' 
that was the subject of Yates' famous book.183 Cicero explains: 
The most complete pictures are formed in our minds of the things that have 
been conveyed to them and imprinted on them by the senses, but the keenest 
of all our senses is the sense of sight, and consequently perceptions received 
by the ears or by reflexion can be most easily retained if they are also conveyed 
to our minds by the mediation of the eyes. l84 
'Keenest' is perhaps not quite right; smells, for example, are 'keen', and one 
can recognise remarkable numbers of them. But the 'space' of smells does not 
seem to have a natural structure, whereas it is the geometry of images that 
makes them so structured, and hence useful for representing the structure of 
anything else. This is how the actual art works, as explained classically in the 
Rhetoric to Herennius: the orator imagines a building, with rooms, arches, 
statues. He places in them objects that will stimulate recall of the matter to be 
remembered. A ram with huge testicles, for example, will suggest testimony. 
Then while delivering the speech, he mentally visits the places in the correct 
order, thus recalling the speech. The medievals revived the art, applying it to the 
many texts that were memorised by all educated people, notably the Psalms. 
The illuminated capitals and marginal grotesques in medieval books are not just 
decoration. They are to enhance the visual memory of the page.185 
Memory was of course closely connected with education, especially training 
'by rote'. One of the architects of medieval pedagogy was Hugh of Saint 
Victor, inventor of possibly the largest diagram of the middle ages. It is his 
Mystical Ark of Noah, intended to organise the whole of knowledge and allow 
its recall. None of the surviving manuscripts attempt to picture it, as it is 
obviously too big to draw, and only fits in the imagination. It has all the 
patriarchs, popes and so on, also a map of the world, the vices, virtues, seasons 
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and so on and on. It is organised with ladders, wheels and trees. Everything is 
in it.186 
By what one may call the Cutty Sark phenomenon, the art of memory 
reached its most perfect form when it was already superseded, after the 
invention of printing. Father Ricci amazed the Chinese with this piece of 
Western technology, as with many others, using a vast memory theatre to 
achieve recall of Chinese characters.187 Even more remarkable were the vast 
museum pieces of Giulio Camillo and Robert Fludd. Camillo's description of 
what he is doing is too overgrown with Hermetic and occult accretions to 
understand, but it is interesting in that it was actually constructed, in wood 
(though on what scale is now impossible to tell). It also attracted a brief 
description by a not entirely sympathetic visitor, who found in the idea of it 
something still of note: 
The work is of wood, marked with many images, and full of little boxes; 
there are various orders and grades in it. He gives a place to each individual 
figure and ornament, and he showed me such a mass of papers that .. . He 
calls this theatre of his by many names, saying now that it is a built or 
constructed mind or soul, and now that it is a windowed one. He pretends 
that all things that the human mind can conceive and which we cannot see 
with the corporeal eye, after being collected together by diligent meditation 
may be expressed by certain corporeal signs in such a way that the beholder 
may at once perceive with his eyes everything that is otherwise hidden in the 
depths of the human mind. And it is because of this corporeal looking that he 
calls it a theatre.lBB 
A mind realised in hardware, with all human knowledge in it, arranged in a 
natural way, hence content-addressable and immediately accessible! It is a 
dream yet to be realised by the AI and database communities. The modern 
equivalent is Lenat's CYC project, which aims to achieve artificial intelligence 
by having teams of typists enter all commonsense knowledge;189 so far it is in the 
same state as Camillo's theatre appeared to his patron, the king of France: 
money goes in, and promises come back out. But one effect of the CYC project 
has been to make clear that AI confirms what the medievals presumed: to make 
sense of experience, one must know (that is, remember) a lot. 
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The unique aspect of Camillo's plan is that the organisation is topographic, 
in the most literal possible sense. The reader can no doubt visualise the place in 
his local library where the books on his favourite subject are kept, and finds 
unsettling the librarians' periodic rearrangements. 
The second use of mental images, perhaps the most widely applied in 
medieval and Renaissance times, was to encourage meditation during prayer. 
The majority of mental pictures, like the majority of physical pictures, were 
painted to assist the soul. The medieval soul is not, according to itself, full of 
voices, but of forms. If modern introspection reveals neuroses and a stream of 
words, the medieval tended rather to find sins and visions. If the soul of a 
medieval was touched by God, it did not experience a voice from God so much 
as a 'vision'. (Some of the visions are very diagrammatic, too, especially those of 
Joachim of Fiori and Hildegard of Bingen, regarded as having considerable 
meaning. l90) The imagination was made much of by the School of Saint Victor, 
in the twelfth century.191 Visions may be for saints, but 
anyone can enter into the interior of his conscience and meditate in his 
mind's eye on Christ's wound, so that he conforms to Christ's sufferings.192 
Each of Saint Ignatius of Loyola's Spiritual Exercises begins with a 'prelude' 
along the lines of: 
The second prelude is to form a mental image of the scene and to see in my 
imagination the road from Nazareth to Bethlehem. I will consider its length 
and breadth, and whether it is level or winding through valleys and over 
hills. 193 
Teresa of Avila's Interior Castle is more like a picture gallery than a library; 
though she is concerned to distinguish the true visions that adorn it from mere 
works of the imagination.194 
The typical late medieval, then, was trained to exercise his imagination from 
his first youth. 
2.2. The Imagination as a Tool of Scientific Visualisation 
It has been argued several times above that various scientific thinkers must 
have been reasoning spatially in their imagination, particularly in cases like 
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astronomy and perspective that involve heavy use of three dimensions. This 
ought to be obvious, but the ludicrous misunderstandings possible are illustrated 
by C.S. Lewis. Lewis would be expected to understand mental images, since, 
according to his student Ken Tynan, he was usually able to quote from a page, 
given the bay number in his room, the shelf number, how many books from the 
left, and the page number. Yet he comments on Albert the Great: 
I do not understand why boni imaginativi should tend, as he says they do, to 
be good at mathematics. Can this mean that paper was too precious to be 
wasted and you geometrised, as far as possible, with figures merely held 
before the mind's eye? But I doubt it; there was always sand.195 
No-one can reason in the sand, since his brain is not there. You might as well 
say that someone who reads music needs no internal sense of rhythm, on the 
grounds that the notes are all there on the page. Or that a reader of words does 
not need to know their meanings, since the meanings are all in the dictionary. 
One can only reason with internal representations. 
We now come to the evidence for saying that those who reasoned with the 
imagination were in general consciously aware of doing so, and saw the 
imagination as a tool of scientific visualisation. 
Plato sometimes uses mental diagrams to represent abstract relations of 
proportion,196 and Aristotle has the memory forming a kind of scale model of 
magnitudes, both spatial and temporal,197 but generally the earliest writers do 
not much emphasise the role of the imagination in mathematics. Proclus, 
however, in the only developed ancient philosophy of mathematics, holds that 
the imagination is where geometry is done. For the usual Platonist reasons, he 
thinks physical diagrams are unsuitable: 'the circle in sensible things is inferior 
in precision, infected with straightness, and falls short of the purity of 
immaterial circles'. On the other hand, the pure understanding cannot do 
geometry either, since its concepts are simple, or 'wrapped up', and there is 
only one of each kind, so that it cannot deal with circles of different sizes. So 
the understanding projects images 'distinctly and individually on the screen of 
the imagination', which provides a kind of 'intelligible matter' for them.19B The 
passage is an influential one. Kepler is enthusiastic,199 while A. Piccolomini 
claims that Proclus' placing of the mathematicals in the imagination explains 
the certainty of mathematics.20o 
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Alhazen remarks that visual rays are imaginary (lineae imaginabiles in the 
Latin);201 Clyne ymagined' is also Chaucer's phrase for meridians of longitude 
and the ec1iptic.202 The point that a diagram is a device to create a three-
dimensional model in the imagination is made by a thirteenth-century Islamic 
writer: 
In drawing ... I have not aimed for completeness. My purpose was to present 
an arrangement so it can be understood in the whole and in detail. One 
realizes that there is obscurity in the representation of solid bodies, but in the 
imagination one can fit one thing to another, view it from any angle, dissect 
it, and thus assemble it step by step. All the drawings that I have made are 
simple, so that they give a clear picture.203 
Hence, the fact that medieval scientific and technological diagrams are 
sometimes hard to interpret for us does not show that those diagrams failed to 
support good scientific inference. Living in a post-perspective world, we have 
it easy.204 
There may be a case for connecting later medieval reasonings in the 
imagination with the use in philosophy of cases secundum imaginationem, 
which can only exist through God's absolute power.205 The work on 'physics' 
of the 'Merton School', it has been pointed out, is purely ' in the head': it 
considers only imaginary cases, and confronts real experience only via 'well-
known' (that is, remembered) facts such as that a spinning top occupies the 
same place.206 Heytesbury says at one point that he is proceeding only 
secundum imaginationem: cases like acceleration to infinity and diminution to 
zero quantity are not physically possible, but are imaginable and should be 
considered.207 It has been maintained that this procedure separates the 
medieval scientific methodology from the modern, experimental one. It could 
just as well be maintained that medieval 'physics ' is really mathematics. In the 
modern theory of differential equations, one will certainly want to consider 
various limiting cases, and for the same reasons as the medievals. 
Still, the imaginative and the philosophical methods of reasoning are not 
entirely compatible. Henry of Ghent, about 1300, calls some opponents 
those of whom the Commentator says that in them the imaginative virtue 
dominates over the cognitive virtue, and so, he says, they do not believe 
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demonstrations unless the imagination accompanies them, for they cannot 
believe that there is neither plenum nor vacuum nor time outside the world 
... mathematical imaginations and what is outside the heaven seem to them 
infinite ... Therefore such people are melancholy and make the best 
mathematicians, but the worst metaphysicians, because they cannot extend 
their understanding beyond site and magnitude.208 
It will come as no surprise to find Oresme the most explicit on reasoning in the 
imagination. He thought of his graphs not, in the first instance, as on paper, but 
in the imagination: 
Every measurable thing except numbers is imagined in the manner of 
continuous quantity. Therefore, for the mensuration of such a thing, it is 
necessary that points, lines and surfaces, or their properties, be imagined. For 
in them [i.e. the geometrical entities], as the Philosopher has it, measure or 
ratio is initially found, while in other things it is recognized by similarity as 
they are being referred by the intellect to them [i.e., to geometrical entities]. 
Although indivisible points, or lines, are non-existent, still it is necessary to 
feign them mathematically for the measures of things and for the 
understanding of their ratios. Therefore every intensity which can be acquired 
successively ought to be imagined by a straight line perpendicularly erected 
on some point of the space or subject of the intensible thing, e.g., a quality. 
For whatever ratio is found to exist between intensity and intensity, in relating 
intensities of the same kind, a similar ratio is found to exist between line and 
line, and vice versa.209 
The imagination is better than paper for graphs in higher dimensions: 
By a like imagination the quality of a surface is imagined as a kind of body, 
whose longitude and latitude is the extent of the surface and whose depth is 
the intensity of the quality. 
So what about the quality of a three-dimensional object? Do we need a fourth 
dimension to graph its intensity? No, 
because while a flowing point is imagined as causing a line, a line a surface, 
and a surface a body, it is not necessary, if a body is imagined flowing, that it 
causes a fourth type of quantity, but only a body.210 
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This can only mean that the flow in the imagination is what represents the 
fourth dimension. Oresme himself describes the forerunners of his idea, in an 
effort to excuse himself from the vice of novelty: 
It is sought whether a quality is to be imagined as a surface. 
It is argued on the negative ... 
I respond that the statement is true and could be confirmed by the writers on 
perspective like Witelo and Lincoln [Grosseteste], who in this manner imagine 
the intensity of light, and by Aristotle, who in the fourth [book] of the Physics 
imagines time by means of a line, and by the Commentator [Campanus] in 
the fifth [book] of this [commentary on Euclid's Elements], where he holds, 
in expounding ratios, that everything having the nature of a continuum can 
be imagined as a line, surface or body.2l1 
The originals212 do use geometrical magnitudes to represent non-geometrical 
magnitudes, but only the optical writers speak of anything 'imaginary'. 
Aristotle had maintained that the form of a work of art, or a building, exists 
beforehand in the soul of the artist.213 According to Alberti, architecture does 
not happen on the building site, or even on paper, but in the imagination: 
It is quite possible to project whole forms in the mind without recourse to the 
material, by designating and determining a fixed orientation and conjunction 
for the various lines and angles. Since that is the case, let lineaments be the 
precise and correct outline, conceived in the mind, made up of lines and 
angles, and perfected in the learned intellect and imagination. 214 
It is clear that the role of the imagination in both pure and applied 
mathematical contexts was taken for granted by the time of the Scientific 
Revolution. 
2.3 Calileo's Thought Experiments 
It has been a source of embarrassment for many historians of science that 
Galileo, when he is supposed to be founding modern science by performing 
experiments, is actually caught doing his experiments in thought. Examples are 
common; let us take a crucial one in his early work, On Motion: 
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... a larger stone does not fall more swiftly than a smaller. Those who are 
surprised by this conclusion will also be surprised by the fact that a very large 
piece of wood can float on water, no less than a small piece. For the 
reasoning is the same. Thus, if we imagine (si mente conciperemus) that the 
water on which a large piece of wood and a small piece of the same wood are 
afloat, is gradually made successively lighter, so that finally the water 
becomes lighter than the wood, and both pieces slowly begin to sink, who 
could every say that the large piece would sink first or more swiftly than the 
small piece? 
Again, if we imagine, for example, a large piece of wax floating on water, 
and we mix this wax either with sand or some other heavier substances ... 
I argue as follows in proving that bodies of the same material but of 
unequal volume move with the same speed. Suppose there are two bodies of 
the same material, the larger a, and the smaller b, and suppose, if it is 
possible, as asserted by our opponent, that a moves more swiftly than b. We 
have, then, two bodies of which one moves more swiftly. Therefore, 
according to our assumption, the combination of the two bodies will move 
more slowly than that part which by itself moved more swiftly than the other. 
If, then, a and b are combined, the combination will move more slowly than 
a alone. But the combination of a and b is larger than a is alone. Therefore, 
contrary to the assertion of our opponents, the larger body will move more 
slowly than the smaller.215 
Where does the 'combination' of a and b take place? According to Aquinas, it 
is the 'phantasy or imagination' that is the organ of 'combining and dividing'.216 
Galileo's 'gradually' and 'successively' in this passage are significant: like 
Oresme with his 'flowing point', he regards the imagination as a (more or less) 
continuous medium. By movement through that continuous medium, he can 
perform his characteristic transformation to a limiting, ideal case, which is still 
physically meaningful, but inaccessible to real experiment.217 Where the 
medievals used imaginary cases, like motion in the void, largely for critical 
purposes, Galileo uses them constructively, regarding them as simple versions 
of reality, to which complex real cases approximate.218 
And is Galileo evasive about the imaginary nature of his experiments? 
Modest? Repentant? No, he is brazen: 
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SIMPLICIO: So you have not made a hundred tests, or even one? 
SALVIATI: Without experiment, I am sure that the effect will happen as I tell 
you, because it must happen that way.219 
As Kuhn remarks, 'Surely he did experiments, but he is even more noteworthy 
as the man who brought the medieval thought-experimental tradition to its 
highest form'.22o 
Experimenting in the imagination is a lot cheaper than in the lab, of course, 
and faster, like modern simulations by computer, but like them is exposed to 
the objection that it will not tell you how the real world is, since in thought, 
presumably, anything can happen. 
This is the nub of the matter. Imagination, used as a tool for scientific 
reasoning by an expert like Galileo, is not infinitely plastic, and hence divorced 
from reality, but incorporates a lot of structure, parts of which restrict what can 
happen in other parts. This is why actual experiments on motion on an inclined 
plane can be relevant to what would happen with vertical motion in a vacuum, 
and the imagination can mediate between the two. Feynman, a modern physicist 
who was champion of imagination over mathematical formalism, explains that 
the point of the scientific imagination is the constraints it incorporates: 
The whole question of imagination in science is often misunderstood by 
people in other disciplines. They overlook the fact that whatever we are 
allowed to imagine in science must be consistent with everything else we 
know .. . We can't allow ourselves to seriously imagine things which are 
obviously in contradiction to the known laws of nature. And so our kind of 
imagination is quite a difficult game.22J 
The question is, how does the imagination acquire that structure that mimics 
the world, and which allows it to be used as a bridge between real experiments 
and what would happen in counterfactual circumstances? One way or another, 
the imagination must be structured by the flux of ordinary experience. An 
indication of how it happens can be had by recalling Steven's Wreath of 
Spheres diagram, which is a thought experiment not unlike Galileo's. The fact 
that the spheres do not revolve in either direction, but hang in equilibrium, is 
a deliverance of the imagination, but is not a logical truth. It must, therefore, 
be a distillation of experience. It follows that the process of using the 
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imagination to learn the results of thought experiments is a kind of 
reminiscence. That is what Aquinas says: the 'phantasy or imagination' is for 
the 'retention and conservation' of forms.222 More to the point, it is what 
Galileo says. Salviati is encouraging Simplicio to realise that a stone released 
from a sling moves off tangentially: 
SALVIATI: The unraveling depends upon some data well known and 
believed by you just as much as by me, but because they do not strike you, I 
shall cause you to resolve the objection by merely recalling them. 
SIMPLICIO: I have frequently studied your manner of arguing, which gives 
me the impression that you lean toward Plato's opinion that nostrum scire sit 
quoddam reminisci [our knowing is a kind of reminiscence] ... 
SALVIATI: Well, then, what is its motion? 
SIMPLICIO: Let me think a moment here, for I have not formed a picture 
of it in my mind. 
SALVIATI: Listen to that, Sagredo; here is the quoddam reminisci in action, 
sure enough. Well, Simplicia, you are thinking a long time. 
SIMPLICIO: So far as I can see, the motion received on leaving the notch 
can only be along a straight line .. . 223 
Two other arguments in the Dialogue involve Socratic questioning of 
Simplicio's 'memory'; they are both purely geometric arguments. In one of 
them, Simplicio is gradually forced to draw a diagram of the Copernican 
universe, led by purely geometrical considerations.224 
Let us separate two questions that may occur on reading Galileo. Can one 
get a reasonably consistent answer by quizzing people's imagination on, for 
example, what happens when a body whirled on a string is released? And if so, 
is the answer the correct one, as Galileo suggests? Modern psychology has 
investigated and the answers are respectively 'yes' and 'sometimes'. Consistent 
patterns of expectation about motion are found on eliciting subjects' 'intuitive 
physics' or 'naive physics' by asking them to imagine what motion would occur 
in various circumstances. Some subjects give the correct answers, but a high 
proportion, even those educated in physics, persist in mistakes like expecting 
curved motion to continue in a curve when released.225 The authors of these 
studies claim that all the different medieval errors about the motion of 
projectiles and circular impetus can be found among present-day college 
students. This suggests, among other things, that the medievals were doing their 
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physics by the same kind of imaginative reasoning from experience as the 
psychologists are now studying. 
2.4 Epilogue: Philosophy Moves Inside 
The story would not be complete without at least a brief mention of the fact 
that a Philosophical Revolution occurred at the same time as the Scientific 
one, and that it too was driven by inference from mental images. 
Kant claimed to have effected a 'Copernican revolution ' in philosophy, 
meaning a fundamental change in viewpoint. He had in mind his claim that 
necessities, such as mathematical ones, previously thought to be in the world, 
were removed, in his philosophy, into the cognitive apparatus. Almost everyone 
has thought that such a reversal of point of view was indeed a revolution, but 
that its true Copernicus was Descartes. It is universally agreed that 'modern' 
philosophy began when the Cartesian cogito transferred the central question of 
philosophy from metaphysics to epistemology. It is the interior viewpoint that 
Descartes starts from which makes the problem of knowledge of the external 
world central. The point was argued at length by the modern Thomists, who 
saw Descartes as having diverted philosophy into several centuries of the 'way 
of ideas' and idealism by beginning with the certainty of mental images, and 
asking, 'How do we get out?'226 
Descartes certainly had a well-trained imagination, and its training was on 
geometry. In the Discourse, he says of his early studies in geometry: 
[Geometry] is so closely tied to the examination of figures that it cannot 
exercise the intellect without greatly tiring the imagination.227 
That is the opposite to the naive thought that imagining a few pictures should 
be easy, even if the logical reasoning is difficult. Not so difficult, though, that 
he will not recommend hard work with the imagination to others. Rule 14 of 
Rules for the Direction of the Mind is: 
The problem should be re-expressed in terms of the real extension of bodies 
and should be pictured in our imagination entirely by means of bare figures. 
Thus it will be perceived much more distinctly by our intellect.228 
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Among the figures suggested is a family tree. It is only with Rule 15 that 
permission is given for the diagrams to be drawn on paper. 
On the question of whether training in mathematics is for the purpose of 
learning imaginative modelling or logical reasoning, Descartes prefers the 
latter, but concedes it is possible to do mathematics imaginatively: 
The fact that there are some people who are clever at Mathematics but less 
successful in subjects like Physics, is not due to any defect in their powers of 
reasoning, but is the result of their having done Mathematics not by reasoning 
but by imagining-everything they have accomplished has been by means of 
imagination. Now, in Physics there is no place for imagination, and this 
explains their signal lack of success in the subject.229 
In the Meditations, Descartes examines the difference between the 
imagination and the 'pure understanding': 
When I imagine a triangle, for example, I do not merely understand that it is 
a figure bounded by three lines, but at the same time I also see the three lines 
with my mind's eye as if they were present before me; and this is what I call 
imagining. But if I want to think of a chiliagon, although I understand that it 
is a figure consisting of a thousand sides just as well as I understand the 
triangle to be a three-sided figure, I do not in the same way imagine the 
thousand sides or see them as if they were present before me .. . But suppose 
I am dealing with a pentagon: I can of course understand the figure of a 
pentagon, just as I can the figure of a chlliagon, without the help of the 
imagination; but I can also imagine a pentagon, by applying my mind's eye 
to its five sides and the area contained within them. And in doing this I notice 
quite clearly that imagination requires a peculiar effort of mind which is not 
required for understanding ... 230 
Elsewhere, Descartes claims that a heptagon or octagon can only be imagined 
with difficulty, but that was he, 'who is a fairly imaginative man and has trained 
his mind in this field for some time', can do it 'reasonably distinctly'. In the same 
place he emphasises how like imagination perception is, the only difference 
being that the images are imprinted in one case without and in the other case 
with external objects.231 Again, in defining his crucial term 'idea', Descartes 
102 JAMES FRANKLIN 
distinguishes an idea from an image in the imagination, but the difference is 
not large: 
Thus it is not only the images depicted in the imagination that I call 'ideas'. 
Indeed, in so far as these images are in the corporeal imagination, that is, are 
depicted in some part of the brain, I do not call them 'ideas' at all; I call 
them 'ideas' only in so far as they give form to the mind itself, when it is 
directed towards that part of the brain.232 
It is true that here, by agreeing with the scholastics that the imagination is 
'corporeal', Descartes distinguishes some internal pictures from what is really 
in the 'ego'.233 Nevertheless, it is clear that Descartes' 'idea' has a spatial 
content lacking in the modern 'concept', and that this survival of the medieval 
theory of the imagination is at the bottom of much of what moderns find bizarre 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth-century 'way of ideas' in philosophy.234 
And it is no accident that Descartes' 'representative' theory of perception is 
essentially the same as Aristotle's theory of memory. According to Aristotle, 
one can regard a memory image, like any picture, either simply as a painted 
thing or as a likeness.235 It is in the latter mode that memory is a kind of 
inference, from image to thing pictured. Indeed, Aristotle emphasises that 
recollecting is a sort of inference, hence, he thinks, peculiar to humans: 
For when a man is recollecting he infers that he has seen or heard or 
experienced something of the sort before, and the process is a kind of 
search.236 
Aristotle says that memory is inference from internal pictures. Descartes' 
Copernican revolution in philosophy is the claim that all perception is 
inference from internal pictures. 
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